Re-reading discourse and social psychology: transforming social psychology

This paper considers one theme in the contemporary legacy of Potter and Wetherell's (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology. It overviews the context that led to that book and considers a series of critical responses from both experimental and critical/qualitative social psychologists. It refutes criticisms and corrects confusions. Focusing on contemporary discursive psychology, it highlights (a) its rigorous use of records of actual behaviour; (b) its systematic focus on normative practices. In methodological terms, it (a) highlights limitations in the use of open-ended interviews; (b) considers the way naturalistic materials provide access to participants’ own orientations and displays; (c) builds a distinctive logic of sampling and generalization. In theoretical terms, it (a) highlights the way discourse work can identify foundational psychological matters; (b) offers a novel approach to emotion and embodiment; (c) starts to build a matrix of dimensions which are central to the constructing and recognizing of different kinds of social actions. It now offers a fully formed alternative social psychology which coordinates theory and method and a growing body of empirical work

Cognition and conversation

This article considers the different approaches to cognition in conversation analysis (CA) and discursive psychology (DP). Its points are illustrated through a critical but appreciative consideration of an article by Drew in which he uses conversation analysis to identify ‘cognitive moments’ in interaction. Problems are identified with Drew’s analysis and the conclusions he draws. In particular, he a) presupposes a dualistic division between depth and surface; b) makes circular inferences from conventional conversational patterns to underlying cognitive entities; c) presupposes (rather than demonstrates) that the underlying cognitive entities influence conduct. It is argued that none of these things is required by conversation analysis; rather Drew is imposing cognitivist assumptions on conversational materials. Discursive psychology’s approach focuses on cognitive issues in terms of how they are constructed and oriented to in interaction; its virtues are pressed

Beyond cognitivism

What is the appropriate relation between the fields of language and social interaction (LSI) research and cognitive psychology? I wish to speculate about one possible future where LSI hijacks much of the action that would have been considered the province of cognitive psychology, respecifying and reorienting it as it does so. In this future, LSI becomes a foundational discipline in the social sciences rather than existing merely to service one of a wide array of different topic areas. It is a future of ambition and creative argument. LSI might need a name change, though

Discursive psychology: between method and paradigm

Hammersley (2003) criticizes a particular style of discourse research for developing as a distinct paradigm, yet lacking the coherence a paradigm would require. He suggests a range of problems in relation to constructionism, reflexivity and the ‘thin’ model of the human actor, and argues instead for methodological eclecticism in which discourse analytic methods are supplementary to alternatives. This commentary highlights a range of confusions and misunderstandings in this critique. In particular, it highlights the way discourse analytic work is connected to a range of theoretical notions, most fundamentally in its theorizing of discourse itself as a medium oriented to action. It identifies important sources of incoherence that can arise when mixing discourse analytic and more traditional methods. It reiterates the virtues of constructionism, particularly when considering the operation of descriptions, stresses the value of exploring (rather than ignoring) reflexive issues, and emphasizes the rich and nuanced approach to psychology that has been developed in this tradition

Practical scepticism

Practical scepticis

Discourse analysis and constructionist approaches: theoretical background

This chapter is structured in terms of questions and answers. There are several reasons for adopting this format. First, people often consult a handbook to find the answers to questions so the format may simplify this task. Second, most constructionist approaches place a considerable emphasis on dialogueand question-answer sequences are dialogue in one of its most prototypical forms. Third, constructionist researchers have been at the forefront of moves to rethink the literary forms in which social science is presented. I shall start with some general questions about constructionism and its place in psychology, and then I shall move on to focus on issues of method and analysis. I shall concentrate upon general principles and arguments, however, this is not intended to be a how-to-do-it chapter. Chapter 11, by Rosalind Gill, provides a more fleshed out example of a particular style of constructionist research

Post-cognitive psychology

This paper speculates about what will, and should, follow cognitivism in psychology in the new century. It highlights the importance of the work of Wittgenstein, Sacks and Edwards for the development of post-cognitive psychology. Cognitivism is criticized for failing to conceptualize practices in a way that recognizes their action orientation and co-construction, and to appreciate how they are given sense through people's categories, formulations and orientations. Discursive psychology focuses on the production of versions of reality and cognition as parts of practices in natural settings. It is offered as one potential successor to cognitivism

Fragments in the realization of relativism

Fragments in the realization of relativis

A discursive psychology of institutions

Over the last decade or so discursive psychology has developed as a distinct perspective within social psychology, psychology and social science more generally (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Edwards, 2001). One of the things that differentiates it from other approaches is its conceptualisation of psychology itself. Most social psychological takes as at least a central topic an inner representation or processing system of some kind. This is true of social cognition work, of social representations research, and of many strands of newer approaches to subjectivity. Inner representations and processes are seen as central to understanding human action. This paper is not intended to criticise this view; rather it will further develop a discursive psychological alternative

How to study experience

Social analysts find it hard to throw off the dualism of traditional psychology. Discursive psychology offers a non-dualistic approach to psychological matters that works with the displays and orientations of participants, and recognizes that psychological matters are managed immediately and subtly through the normative resources of interaction. James Cresswell attempts to provide an alternative account of ‘experience’; drawing on the writing of Bakhtin, he offers a kind of socialized dualism. His account is illustrated by analysing talk from an open-ended interview. The current article (a) offers an alternative analysis of that talk highlighting the operation of highly conventional repair sequences; (b) questions Cresswell’s inferences from the interviewee’s talk to their underlying ‘experiences’; (c) illustrates how matters that might classically be considered as ‘experiential’ can be handled from a non-dualistic interactional perspective, using an example from a research programme on crying and upset; and (d) offers some general principles for the study of ‘experience’